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I.

INTRODUCTION

Deference is a bedrock concept in administrative law.1
Chevron deference, at a high level of generality, requires federal
courts to defer to agencies’ reasonable constructions of
ambiguous statutes.2 Auer deference requires courts to defer to
agencies’ reasonable constructions of their own regulations.3
Cornell J.D., 2019. Attorney, United States Department of Justice. I
appreciate the helpful feedback provided by Casey Chalbeck, Benjamin
Waldman, Victoria Inojosa, George El-Khoury, and Ali Shan Ali Bhai.
1. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron as Law, 107 GEO. L.J. 1613, 1615 (2019)
(“[Chevron] has a strong claim to being the most important case in all of
administrative law.”); Jonathan H. Adler, Restoring Chevron’s Domain, 81 MO.
L. REV. 983, 983 (2016) (“Chevron has been among the most important and
consequential administrative law decisions of all time.”).
2. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
844 (1984).
The use of the word “constructions,” as opposed to
“interpretations,” in this sentence and the sentence that follows flows from a
view that I find persuasive—that most Chevron cases are about construction
and not interpretation. See Lawrence B. Solum & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron
as Construction, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1465, 1469–70 (2020).
3. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 457–58 (1997).
*
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However, deference has become controversial in the academic
literature and in Supreme Court opinions.4 Critics claim that
deference is either unconstitutional, incompatible with the
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA),5 or antithetical to
Anglo-American constitutionalism.6
One argument against Auer deference turns on a murky
concept called the “force of law” (FOL).7 For now, we can
stipulate that when an agency action “binds” regulated parties,
it carries the FOL.8 That uninterrogated notion is reflected in
blackletter law.9 Critics of deference suggest that if an
interpretive rule receives Auer deference, it has been imbued
with the FOL.10 For “APA originalists,” this poses a conceptual
4. See generally Christopher J. Walker, Attacking Auer and Chevron
Deference: A Literature Review, 16 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 103 (2018) (providing
a review of recent arguments for eliminating or narrowing the Chevron and
Auer deference regimes).
5. See Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 553–559,
701–706 (2012).
6. See, e.g., Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120 (2018) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“The proper rules [of deference] for interpreting statutes and
determining agency jurisdiction and substantive agency powers should accord
with constitutional separation-of-powers principles and the function and
province of the Judiciary.”); Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference
to Executive Interpretation, 126 YALE L.J. 908, 977 (2017); PHILIP HAMBURGER,
IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 8 (2014) (“It thus should be evident that,
in returning to consolidated extra- and supralegal power, administrative law
revives a sort of power that constitutions were emphatically designed to
prohibit.”). These rationales are not exhaustive. Some critics of deference
believe that either Chevron or Auer deference should simply be replaced with
a less deferential standard. See, e.g., Jack M. Beerman, End the Failed
Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why it Can and
Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 843–50 (2010).
7. See infra Part I.
8. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules
with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 471
(2002). For the purposes of the article, I place derivatives of “binding” in
quotations when I am merely using the word. Cf. Lawrence B. Solum,
Originalism Versus Living Constitutionalism: The Conceptual Structure of the
Great Debate, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1243, 1262–63 (2019) (distinguishing between
the word “originalism” and originalism as a concept). That word is used to
refer to several contested and interlocking concepts. When I am referring to
one of those disaggregated concepts, derivatives of binding will appear in
italics.
9. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979) (equating the
FOL with whether rules are “binding”).
10. See, e.g., Aditya Bamzai, Delegation and Interpretive Discretion:
Gundy, Kisor, and the Formation and Future of Administrative Law, 133 HARV.
L. REV. 164, 195–96 (2019) (arguing that § 553 of the APA conflicts with Auer
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issue.11
The law distinguishes between “legislative” and
“interpretive” rules using the FOL.12 Legislative rules go
through notice-and-comment rulemaking and carry the FOL.13
Interpretive rules, however, are merely meant to help guide the
public and do not carry the FOL.14 So if Auer injects the FOL
into interpretive rules, Auer may conflict with the APA—
specifically, § 553’s distinction between legislative rules and
guidance.15
This argument was adopted by Justice Gorsuch in his Kisor
dissent. Gorsuch argued that Auer deference “binds” courts so
that an interpretive rule carries the FOL.16 Scholars, even those
who do not oppose deference, have accepted this argument with
alacrity.17 Despite this rising tide, Justice Kagan’s plurality
opinion in Kisor batted down Gorsuch’s dissent with an
argument that appears—at first blush—to rely on a
straightforward definition. According to Kagan, the FOL merely
describes an agency interpretation that can be used in an
enforcement action.18 Interpretive rules do not carry the FOL
because they cannot be used in an enforcement action.19 Kagan’s
is an impossible narrow conception of the FOL, especially after
deference).
11. See generally Evan D. Bernick, Envisioning Administrative Procedure
Act Originalism, 70 ADMIN L. REV. 807 (2018) (envisioning and advocating for
a mode of analyzing whether modern administrative law doctrines are
consistent with the text and structure of the APA).
12. See Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 302 n.31.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See generally Ronald M. Levin, Rulemaking and the Guidance
Exemption, 70 ADMIN. L. REV. 263 (2018) (arguing that § 553 should be read as
distinguishing between two classes of agency actions—legislative rules and
guidance—and that all forms of guidance should be subjected to the same legal
test).
16. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2434 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring).
17. See Steven J. Lindsay, Timing Judicial Review of Agency
Interpretations in Chevron’s Shadow, 127 YALE L.J. 2448, 2454 (2018)
(adopting the view that deference is inconsistent with § 553’s distinction
between legislative rules and guidance, but without calling for the Supreme
Court to reject deference).
18. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2420 (“An interpretive rule itself never forms
‘the basis for an enforcement action’—because, as just noted, such a rule does
not impose any ‘legally binding requirements’ on private parties.”).
19. See id. (“An enforcement action must instead rely on a legislative rule,
which (to be valid) must go through notice and comment.”).
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the judiciary has spent decades expanding the concept.20
Because the plurality did not flesh out its argument, the FOL
argument against Auer deference is bound to linger.
The FOL argument in Kisor is symptomatic of a larger issue
in the administrative law canon. The simplicity of the FOL
formulation—an agency action that “binds” the public carries
the FOL—masks several doctrinal puzzles that have scarcely
been acknowledged, much less solved.21 The FOL is invoked
when courts distinguish between legislative and interpretive
rules. It is also a core concept in the justiciability context.
Increasingly, the FOL concept is becoming central to the
deference case law, as Kisor makes clear. There are many FOL
concepts, each of which implicates different legal norms in its
own domain.22 This is problematic because courts talk about,
and appear to conceive of, the FOL as a unitary concept. The
FOL’s Januslike complexion is further complicated by core intercircuit disputes over what it means to “bind” a regulated party
and who or what must be “bound.”23
This Article is meant to reexamine the FOL by providing a
20. See infra Parts II–III (illustrating the many differing meanings
behind the FOL, all of which have been embraced by different courts at
different times); Bamzai, supra note 10, at 196 (“And therein lies the conflict
with the APA: the plurality’s approach would create a class of agency legal
interpretations that supposedly ‘do not have the force of law’ but nevertheless
are binding on courts through Auer.”).
21. See Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV.
465, 472–73 n.25 (2013) (noting that the FOL concept overlaps with the APA’s
final agency action requirement). See generally Lindsay, supra note 17 (a
superb student note that fleshes out the connection between finality and the
FOL).
22. Cf. Lawrence B. Solum, Disaggregating Chevron, 82 OHIO ST. L.J. 249,
253 (2021) (arguing that there are “many Chevron doctrines, each of which
represents a different legal norm, with its own domain of application and
internal structure”).
23. Compare Texas v. EEOC, 933 F.3d 433, 443–46 (5th Cir. 2019)
(allowing for pre-enforcement review of an agency action even though it was,
by statute, binding on no one), with Am. Tort Reform Ass’n v. OSHA, 738 F.3d
387, 395–96 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (holding that an interpretive rule was not “final”
for judicial review because interpretive rules categorically lack the FOL). This
is not to suggest that the circuits have been entirely consistent on their FOL
rulings. See Nat’l Pork Producers Council v. EPA, 635 F.3d 738, 756 (5th Cir.
2011) (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Norton, 415 F.3d 8, 15 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (“[I]f the practical effect of the agency action is not a certain change in
the legal obligations of a party, the action is non-final for the purpose of judicial
review.”)); see also Lindsay, supra note 17, at 2466–70 (contrasting the circuits’
different approach to the FOL in the context of final agency action).
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conceptual history. It demonstrates that the FOL refers to a
“family” of related concepts.24 This Article is the first to identify
and defend the delimitation between these different FOL
concepts by reference to the text of the APA. As the FOL has
spread, it has come to rest on its compatibility with several
different sections of the APA.25 The “family resemblance”
between these branches of the FOL causes confusion in courts
and in the literature. After delving into the pre- and post-APA
case law, this Article concludes that the plurality was correct in
Kisor. Whether an interpretive rule receives deference is
irrelevant to whether it carries the FOL—at least in the sense
implicated by § 553 of the APA.
The most obvious rebuttal to this Article is to conflate Kisor
with United States v. Mead Corporation.26 There, the Supreme
Court narrowed domain of Chevron by limiting its reach to
agency actions that carry the FOL.27 One might argue that when
an interpretive rule receives Auer deference, it carries the FOL
and thereby violates § 553.
This counterargument is confused by the “family
resemblance” between Kisor and Mead. Even if the Mead FOL
limitation on Chevron deference applies with equal force to Auer
deference, any reliance on that limitation in Kisor was
misplaced. In Mead, the Supreme Court’s invocation of the FOL
simply meant that Chevron deference was limited to “[w]hether
Congress has delegated the authority to adopt legally binding
rules and regulations[.]”28 The Mead FOL is an interpretive
question that is “readily ascertainable from statutory text.”29
Mead and Chevron are best conceptualized as standards of
review governing the construction of ambiguous statutes.30

24. Cf. Solum, supra note 8, at 1264–65 (using the “family resemblance”
concept to describe how different theories of “originalism” are related in loose
and confusing ways).
25. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 704, 706.
26. See generally United States v. Mead Corp, 553 U.S. 218 (2001).
27. See id. at 226–27.
28. Kristin E. Hickman & Aaron L. Nielson, Narrowing Chevron’s
Domain, 70 DUKE L.J. 931, 937–38 (2021).
29. Id. at 938.
30. See Kristin E. Hickman & R. David Hahn, Categorizing Chevron, 81
OHIO ST. L.J. 611, 617 (2020); see also Solum, supra note 22, at 292 (concluding
that “most of the time” Chevron is best conceptualized as a standard of review
applicable to construction).
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They are both part of a body of case law implementing the APA’s
scope of review provisions like § 706(2)(A).31 The interests there
are with expertise and with indicia supporting Chevron’s default
presumption of delegation.32 Whether an agency action carries
the FOL for the purposes of the § 706—whether it is entitled to
Chevron deference—has nothing at all to do with whether an
interpretive rule’s entitlement to Auer deference vitiates § 553.
When an interpretive rule receives Auer deference, it does
nothing to formally change a regulated party’s obligations. It is
not “binding” within the meaning of § 553’s FOL. Anticipating
that some will reach for Mead, I conclude that nothing from that
case supports the § 553 argument from Kisor.
Part I provides a longer explanation of the FOL dispute in
Kisor. In my telling, the plurality and the dissenters were
essentially talking past each other because the FOL’s meaning
has been confused over time. To help resolve that conflict, Part
II explores the case law from the pre-APA period. This Section
shows that the FOL was principally concerned with delegation
and whether an agency could craft penalties to enforce either
statutes or regulations. Part III demonstrates that this meaning
informed the drafting of § 553 of the APA. Part IV discusses the
post-APA period by illustrating the spread of the FOL across
different parts of the administrative law canon. Part V argues
that the Kisor plurality was correct. When a court defers to an
interpretive rule, it does not “bind” anyone or anything in any
sense that is cognizable under § 553. The Conclusion outlines
the impact of the approach taken by this Article.
II. TALKING PAST EACH OTHER: KISOR AND THE FOL
James Kisor is a Vietnam War veteran.33 For decades, he

31. See Hickman & Hahn, supra note 30, at 656; see also Cass R. Sunstein,
Chevron Is Not Inconsistent with the APA, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT
(Sept. 16, 2020), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/chevron-is-not-inconsistentwith-the-apa-by-cass-r-sunstein/ (advancing the same view of Chevron’s
ontology).
32. See, e.g., Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 531 (2009) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (“Certain aspects of statutory interpretation . . . are properly
understood as delegated by Congress to an expert and accountable
administrative body.”); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002) (noting
that deference flows from agency expertise).
33. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2409 (2019) (plurality opinion).
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sought benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)
for post-traumatic stress disorder.34 Decades after being denied
benefits, Kisor moved to reopen his VA-benefits claim.35 The VA
reversed course and granted Kisor benefits, but only from the
date of his motion to reopen.36 The Board of Veterans’ Appeals
affirmed that decision after interpreting the relevant agency
rule.37 That regulation provided that the VA could only grant
Kisor benefits if it found that there were “relevant official service
department records” that the VA had failed to consider in its
initial denial.38 The records Kisor had were not “relevant”
because “they did not go to the reason for the denial.”39
Eventually, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit deferred
to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals’ construction of the VA rule.40
Kisor appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
decide whether it would overrule Auer.
Prior to Kisor, the two principal decisions addressing what
deference courts owe to an agency’s construction of its own
ambiguous rules were Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.41 and
Auer v. Robbins.42 The version of deference that these cases
established became controversial for reasons that are too
numerous and eclectic to explain here.43 Relevant here, the
critics of Auer deference adopted two statutory arguments
against Auer deference, both predicated on the text and
structure of the APA.
The first argument is premised on § 706 of the APA.44 That
provision instructs that “the reviewing court shall decide all
relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the
terms of an agency action.”45 Kisor’s first argument was that
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. Id. (citing 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c)(1) (2013)).
39. Id.
40. See id.
41. See 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
42. See 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
43. See generally Walker, supra note 4 (providing a literature review of
the cases against Auer and Chevron deference).
44. See Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
45. Id.
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§ 706 requires a de novo standard of review, which is
inconsistent with Auer deference for agencies’ construction of
their regulations.46 In that vein, Aditya Bamzai wrote that when
“[r]ead against the history of the APA’s adoption, section 706 is
best interpreted as an attempt to revive the traditional [nondeferential] methodology and to instruct courts to review legal
questions using independent judgment[.]”47 That view has been
adopted a minority of the Supreme Court’s conservative bloc.
Justice Gorsuch argued in his Kisor concurrence that § 706
prohibits deference to agencies’ interpretations of their own
regulations.48 However, Justice Kagan’s plurality opinion
rejected that argument and ultimately won the day.49
Kisor’s second statutory argument turned on § 553 of the
APA.50 That provision requires agencies’ rules to go through
notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures.51
Notice-andcomment rulemaking is a multi-step process by which agencies
solicit public feedback on proposed rules before they become
effective.52 Section 553 provides an exception for “interpretive
rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency
organization, procedure, or practice[.]”53 From this, and for
reasons discussed infra, courts have distinguished between
“legislative” and “interpretive” rules by holding that the former,
and not the latter, carry the FOL.54
46. See generally Bamzai, supra note 6, at 977.
47. Id.
48. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2432 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in
the judgment) (“The APA thus requires a reviewing court to resolve for itself
any dispute over the proper interpretation of an agency regulation. A court
that, in deference to an agency, adopts something other than the best reading
of a regulation isn’t ‘decid[ing]’ the relevant ‘questio[n] of law’ or ‘determin[ing]
the meaning’ of the regulation. Instead, it’s allowing the agency to dictate the
answer to that question.” (alteration in original)).
49. See id. at 2419 (plurality opinion) (“[W]e have long presumed (subject
always to rebuttal) that the Congress delegating regulatory authority to an
agency intends as well to give that agency considerable latitude . . . . Because
of [this presumption] courts do not violate Section 706 by applying Auer. To
the contrary, they fulfill their duty to ‘determine the meaning’ of a rule
precisely by deferring to the agency’s reasonable reading.”).
50. See Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012).
51. See id.
52. See Hickman, supra note 21, at 473–74 (describing the notice-andcomment process).
53. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A).
54. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979); Hickman,
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Kisor argued that Auer deference short-circuits the
distinction between legislative and interpretive rules by
imbuing interpretive rules with the FOL. Unlike the § 706
argument, the § 553 argument would only apply to agencies’
rules that did not go through notice-and-comment rulemaking.55
The § 553 argument first debuted in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers
Association.56 There, one party argued that “interpretive rules
have the force of law because an agency’s interpretation of its
own regulations may be entitled to deference under [Auer.]”57
The Supreme Court held in Perez that interpretive rules never
carry the FOL, even when they receive heightened deference
under Auer.58 However, the Court did not explain this holding
with any depth. Undeterred, Justice Gorsuch relied on the same
short-circuiting argument in his Kisor concurrence. He wrote
that “Auer effectively nullifies the distinction Congress drew” in
§ 553.59 He reasoned that under Auer, “courts must treat as
‘controlling’ not only an agency’s duly promulgated rules but also
its mere interpretations[.]”60 Gorsuch thought that by “binding”
the courts to an interpretation, agencies could breathe the FOL
into an interpretive regulation.61 Gorsuch’s view on the § 553
argument was, nonetheless, briskly shot down by the plurality
opinion.62
The plurality opinion written by Justice Kagan concluded
that Auer was irrelevant to § 553 because Auer deference has
nothing at all to do with whether an interpretive rule carries the
FOL.63 The reasoning, however, has a false definitional
appearance. According to Kagan, interpretive rules do not carry

supra note 21, at 467 (“Whether a particular rule is legislative in character,
and thus must satisfy the notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures
imposed by the APA, depends upon whether the rule carries the force of law.”).
55. See Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 302 (explaining that it is not an issue
for a rule that went through notice and comment to receive deference under
this theory because those rules are “legislative” and are meant to carry the
FOL).
56. 575 U.S. 92 (2015).
57. Id. at 1208 n.4.
58. See id.
59. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2434 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
60. Id.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 2420.
63. See id.
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the FOL because they cannot be used in an enforcement action.64
Because the FOL is the power to “bind” parties in enforcement
actions, interpretive rules lack it.65 The plurality opinion’s
simplified and definitional form of argumentation drew criticism
from some observers.66 But appearances can be deceiving. In
Kisor, Justice Kagan avoided a fleshed-out explanation of her
position. And in the vacuum Kisor has created the importance
of researching the FOL should be manifest.67 This Article is
meant to fill that gap.
III. THE FOL CONCEPT BEFORE THE APA
Several notes on methodology are required upfront. The
rest of the Article devotes considerable time towards discussing
the historical development of the FOL as a phrase referring to a
“family” of related concepts.68 As will be discussed infra, the
FOL is referenced in the contexts of justiciability, the
categorization of agency actions, and in the context of the agency
deference regimes. Because the FOL has spread beyond its
initial use, it has come to signify or invoke slightly different
ideas in each domain. Justice Gorsuch’s argument that § 553
prohibits Auer deference turns on (1) whether § 553 prohibits
interpretive rules from carrying the FOL; and (2) whether that
prohibition is incompatible with Auer deference.
64. See id. (“An interpretive rule itself never forms ‘the basis for an
enforcement action’—because, as just noted, such a rule does not impose any
‘legally binding requirements’ on private parties.”).
65. See id. (“An enforcement action must instead rely on a legislative rule,
which (to be valid) must go through notice and comment.”).
66. See, e.g., Bamzai, supra note 10, at 196 (“And therein lies the conflict
with the APA: the plurality’s approach would create a class of agency legal
interpretations that supposedly ‘do not have the force of law’ but nevertheless
are binding on courts through Auer.”).
67. See Hickman, supra note 21, at 467 (“Perhaps the single most
challenging administrative law question . . . is an old perennial: what does it
mean for agency action to carry the ‘force of law’?”). The FOL has been invoked
directly in three recent Supreme Court cases and indirectly in at least two
others. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 103-05 (2015); Texas
v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by equally divided Court,
136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016); CIC Servs., LLC v. IRS, 925 F.3d 247 (6th Cir. 2019),
rev'd, 141 S. Ct. 1582 (2021); Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter Paul Home
v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020).
68. Cf. Solum, supra note 8, at 1264–66 (using the “family resemblance”
concept to describe how different theories of “originalism” are related in loose
and confusing ways).
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At times, I reference different FOL concepts that each have
their own statutory hooks in the APA. For example, the portion
of Kisor that I focus on concerns § 553 of the APA. An equally
important FOL concept deals with justiciability and is rooted in
§ 704 of the APA.69 That provision simply says that “[a]gency
action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for
which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject
to judicial review.”70 Under the prevailing test, whether an
agency action is “final” for review turns on whether “legal
consequences will flow” from the decision.71 That standard is
essentially conflated by courts with whether an agency action
carries the FOL.72 A third FOL concept flows from § 706(2)(A)
and is associated with Mead and Chevron deference.73 Because
the text of each of these provisions is open-ended, the pre-APA
case law and post-APA understandings of those provisions
feature prominently in this Article.
Everyone agrees that the guidance exemption implies a
FOL distinction between legislative and interpretive rules, and
we can stipulate that § 553 prohibits interpretive rules from
obtaining the same status as legislative rules. From there, we
get to the heart of the question. For an APA originalist, you
might phrase the question as follows: would a hypothetical
member of the public, at the time of the APA’s passage and with
a middling knowledge of the APA’s legal and political
background, understand § 553’s FOL distinction to prohibit
courts from deferring under Auer?74 Because the FOL is a
phrase referring to many concepts, it matters what precisely
§ 553 prohibits. That is, we need to know which FOL is behind
§ 553’s distinction between legislative and interpretive rules.
This methodology flows from the recent explosion in the
69. See Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. § 704.
70. Id.
71. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997) (citing Port of Boston
Marine Terminal Assn. v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71
(1970)).
72. See Levin, supra note 15, at 265 n.2.
73. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Hickman & Hahn, supra note 30, at 617–18
(arguing that Chevron deference is a standard of review that emanates from
§ 706 of the APA).
74. See Bernick, supra note 11, at 843 (“[P]ublic meaning could be
operationalized by the construction of a hypothetical ordinary member of the
1946 public who knows something of the subject matter addressed by the APA,
as well as some of the legal and political background[.]”).
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literature exploring the proper means for interpreting the
APA.75 Due to the sparse language in § 553, courts must judge
how best to interpret the policy judgments that inform the
APA.76
Interpreters must balance a tightrope between
interpretation and construction.77 If interpreters apply the text
in a “hyperliteralist” fashion, agencies may be able to issue
regulations with the FOL without obtaining public consideration
and deliberation.78 If the interpreters imbue the APA with new
policy considerations, they risk engaging in lawmaking.79 This
change, in turn, could upset the balance between agencies,
Congress, the courts, and the public.80
In subsections A-C we begin with background
understandings. This includes evidence about the pre-APA
antecedents of the FOL. The point to those sections is to
establish the FOL as a body of concepts before the drafting of the
APA. Subsection D takes this research and sketches out an
interpretation of § 553 of the APA. This subsection validates the
widely shared reading of that provision. Subsection D also
demonstrates how the FOL is applied in various doctrines after
the enactment of the APA.

75. See, e.g., Kathryn E. Kovacs, Progressive Textualism in
Administrative Law, 118 MICH. L. REV. 134, 137 (2019) (arguing that
progressives should use textualism in the context of administrative law).
76. See Bernick, supra note 11, at 808 (“[T]he APA does not expressly
state the normative principles that animate it[.]”).
77. See generally Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction
Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010) (explaining the distinction between
construction and interpretation).
78. For an example of why interpreters should avoid hyperliteralism, see
Kristin E. Hickman, Did Little Sisters of the Poor Just Gut the APA
Rulemaking Procedures?, YALE J. ON REGUL.: NOTICE & COMMENT (July 9,
2020), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/did-little-sisters-of-the-poor-just-gut-aparulemaking-procedures/. An analysis of Justice Thomas’ opinion in Little
Sisters of the Poor is beyond the scope of this Article. Nonetheless, Professor
Hickman’s criticisms are persuasive.
79. See Bernick, supra note 11, at 809 (“Much of our administrative law .
. . is governed by judicially-created ‘common law’ doctrines that seem
untethered to any text or history.”).
80. See Nicholas Bagley, The Puzzling Presumption of Reviewability, 127
HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1330 (2014) (arguing that when Congress have balanced
“a host of incommensurate values” in a statute, “[t]he courts have no
constitutional authority to revise that judgment and no epistemic basis for
thinking they can make a better one.”); Kovacs, supra note 75, at 137 (“The
APA is not a typical statute. It arose from a long period of public deliberation
and has become deeply entrenched in U.S. law.”).
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A. The Expansion of the Administrative State
Before delving into the FOL, it is important to describe the
circumstances that made it an essential concept. Scholarship
over the last two decades has demonstrated that the
administrative state did not “rise” in the early twentieth
century, it merely expanded and changed.81 From the beginning
of the Republic, Congress delegated “lawmaking” or
“policymaking” authority to nascent federal agencies.82
However, judicial review of agency actions looked remarkably
different in the absence of federal question jurisdiction.83 With
the advent of broad jurisdiction and evolving forms of regulation,
the late-nineteenth century was poised to be consequential.84
Starting in the nineteenth century, Congress created new
federal agencies that touched daily American life.85 In 1887, the
U.S. government created the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC), which regulated the rates and practices of railroads. 86
The law that created the ICC, the Interstate Commerce Act, was
81. See generally JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE
CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW (Yale University Press, 2012) (demonstrating that administrative
governance has been a mainstay since the founding of the country).
82. See Julian Davis Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the
Founding, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 332–49 (2021) (demonstrating that the
First Congress delegated legislative power to agencies across several contexts).
83. See Bamzai, supra note 6, at 948 (“In the absence of general federalquestion jurisdiction—and where a claim did not ‘arise under’ one of the
specific grants of federal-question jurisdiction that Congress enacted during
this period—parties normally had two options: (1) common-law actions in
which the interpretation of a statute was an ancillary step in the analysis; and
(2) extraordinary writs, such as the writ of mandamus, against the executive
branch official charged with enforcing the action.” (citations omitted)).
84. See Ann Woolhandler, Judicial Deference to Administrative Action—
A Revisionist History, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 197, 239 (1991) (“The common-law
tradition of de novo actions against officers received new support in the
Reconstruction era with the passage of the general federal question statute in
1875, and with the passage of the 1871 Civil Rights Act.” (citations omitted)).
85. See JOANNA L. GRISINGER, THE UNWIELDY AMERICAN STATE:
ADMINISTRATIVE POLITICS SINCE THE NEW DEAL 1 (Cambridge University Press,
2012) (“By the end of the 1930s, the bureaucrats were in charge. In expanding
the federal government’s field of play in the preceding decades, Congress and
the White House had created dozens of agencies, departments, bureaus, and
commissions to handle this new and staggering workload.” (footnote omitted)).
86. See Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Rise and Fall of the Interstate
Commerce Commission: The Tortuous Path from Regulation to Deregulation of
America’s Infrastructure, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1151, 1151–52 (2012).
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one of the first statutes to comprehensively regulate any single
industry in the United States.87 Three years after its passage,
Congress enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act.88 Together, “these
two pieces of legislation formed ‘the cornerstone of regulation in
America,’ and from those two acts of Congress came ‘a
proliferation of government regulatory controls.’”89 From this,
new federal agencies were formed such as the Surface
Transportation Board, the Federal Maritime Commission, the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and the Department of
Transportation which regulated “rail, motor, air, and water
carriage, as well as pipelines and freight forwarders.”90 By the
end of the New Deal, citizens were accustomed to receiving
benefits from federal agencies, while regulated entities wrestled
with the scope of agency authority.91
The point of this history, for our purposes, is that the twin
realities of an expanding administrative state and the appellate
review model92 of agency actions challenged prevailing
frameworks for understanding the separation of powers and
judicial review.93 In this state of upheaval, the FOL became a
consequential phrase.

87. See id. at 1162 (citing David M. Warner, To Hell on the Railroads: Why
Our Technology and Law Encourage a Degrading Culture, 26 TRANSP. L.J. 361,
382 (1999)).
88. See Charles S. Dameron, Present at Antitrust’s Creation: Consumer
Welfare in the Sherman Act’s State Statutory Forerunners, 125 YALE L.J. 1072,
1089 (2016).
89. Dempsey, supra note 86, at 1162.
90. Id. at 1152.
91. See GRISINGER, supra note 85, at 2 (describing how individuals came
to receive benefits from various agencies which became so numerous that
“administrative officials . . . had taken on the lion’s share of federal
governance” in the Roosevelt Administration).
92. See Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the
Origins of the Appellate Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L.
REV. 939, 942 (2011) (“Insofar as federal courts are concerned, the appellate
review model first emerged in full blown form in the context of judicial review
of orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) around 1910.”
(footnote omitted)).
93. See
DANIEL R. ERNST,
TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE EMERGES IN AMERICA, 1900-1940 108–118 (2016)
(recognizing this controversy around agencies and analyzing the intellectual
developments that helped ease the transition to administrative governance).
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B. The Rhetoric of Nondelegation and the Categorization of
Agency Actions
As agencies grew and developed new regulatory models,
they implicated the separation of powers.94 Courts began
asserting the rhetoric of a formalistic nondelegation doctrine in
response to expanding delegation of legislative authority. In the
decades before the enactment of the APA, Congress enacted
“skeleton legislation” that would later be “amplified by executive
regulations.”95 Professor Hickman has recently suggested that
lawmaking in this period constituted an eclectic mix of “general,”
“specific,” and “hybrid” delegations.96 These modes of delegation
grew “more numerous and more varied” at the same time that
the Supreme Court adopted more formalistic rhetoric around
nondelegation.97 The FOL helped ease the gap between
congressional delegations and the Supreme Court’s rhetoric and,
in the process, helped establish an important drafting
convention.98
The nondelegation doctrine proceeds from Article I, § 1 of
the Constitution, which vests in Congress the legislative powers

94. Two early cases are sometimes cited as the first involving a
nondelegation principle. See Kristin E. Hickman, Foreword: Nondelegation As
Constitutional Symbolism, 89 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1079, 1087 (2021)
(referencing The Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
382, 387 (1813); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825)).
95. Id. at 1098 (quoting FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S
COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, S. DOC. NO. 77-8, at 98–99 (1941)).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See Merrill & Watts, supra note 8, at 472 (arguing that “Congress
followed a drafting convention that signaled to agencies whether particular
rulemaking grants conferred authority to make rules with the force of law as
opposed to mere housekeeping rules.”). At the time that Merrill and Watts
produced their argument about this drafting convention, they suggested that
most “modern administrative lawyers are not aware of its existence” and
suggested that the failure of appellate judicial opinions to mention the
convention caused it to die out. Id. at 472. Recently, I have discovered a
“missing link” has been found in the form of the “Turney Memo.” See generally
Beau J. Baumann, The Turney Memo, 97 NOTRE DAME L. REV. REFLECTION 155
(2022) (advising the Senate that the Air Commerce Act of 1926 is constitutional
by analyzing the distinction between interpretive and legislative rules). This
document shows that the Senate was advised to follow a FOL drafting
convention after a careful analysis of the Supreme Court’s case law. It suggests
that Congress was aware that the FOL was an important dividing line for the
Supreme Court and that it developed a drafting convention around that fact.
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“herein granted.”99 Nondelegation holds that the separation of
powers prohibits Congress from delegating its legislative powers
to the executive branch.100 Towards the end of the nineteenth
century, the Supreme Court consistently embraced
nondelegation, even as it demurred in the face of numerous
nondelegation challenges.101 In Marshal Field & Co. v. Clark,
for example, the Supreme Court wrote “[t]hat [C]ongress cannot
delegate legislative power to the president is a principle
universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance
of the system of government ordained by the [C]onstitution.”102
For Congress, it was important to figure out how far they
could go in delegating authority to agencies. The first major
development was the categorization of different agency actions.
Fred T. Field, a former member of the Advisory Tax Board of the
Treasury Department, set out in 1920 to develop a theoretical
account for distinguishing between “interpretive regulations,”
“standards,” and “administrative regulations.”103 Standards, as
opposed to the other two categories, had the power to “bind”
regulated parties.104
Later works kept the reference to
“interpretive regulations[,]” but moved towards calling
standards “legislative regulations.”105 In the context of rules, the
two main types of rules are “substantive” and “procedural.”106
“Substantive rules regulate the primary behavior of parties
outside the walls of the issuing agency[.]”107 If a substantive rule
carries the FOL, it is a “legislative” rule.108 If it does not, then
99. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
100. See Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 82, at 282–89 (explaining the
rise and fall of the nondelegation doctrine).
101. See Hickman, supra note 94, at 7–8 (“Either way, although the Court
has routinely upheld statutes against nondelegation claims, it has consistently
and repeatedly—for roughly two centuries and in recent decades—embraced
the basic premise that Congress cannot delegate the legislative powers vested
in it by Article I of the Constitution to other parties.” (citations omitted)).
102. 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892).
103. Fred T. Field, The Legal Force and Effect of Treasury Interpretations,
in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 91, 99–111 (Robert Murray Haig ed., 1921).
104. See id. at 100.
105. See, e.g., Frederic P. Lee, Legislative and Interpretive Regulations, 29
GEO. L.J. 1, 2 (1940); James Hart, The Exercise of Rule Making Power, in
REPORT BY PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT 309, 317–
21 (1937).
106. See Merrill & Watts, supra note 8, at 477.
107. Id.
108. See id.
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the rule is “interpretive.”109
These categorizations were used as the conceptual
framework around delegation and, as a result, statutory
construction. Contrary to the scholarship up to this point, which
has suggested that the earliest version of the FOL was
mysterious and was not memorialized in any surviving texts,110
recently reproduced sources show that the FOL was critical to
the development of the early administrative state. The Office of
Legal Counsel for the United States Senate began advising
senators on the distinction between legislative and interpretive
rules in a 1929 memo.111 The memo’s author suggested that the
nondelegation doctrine was a paper tiger with a single exception
rooted in the FOL.112
The memo argued that Congress had established, and the
Supreme Court had vindicated, delegations of legislative
authority in sweeping terms.113 The only significant limitation,
which was itself rooted in the moribund nondelegation doctrine,
was that agencies could not always provide for penalties in
carrying out a statutory regime.114 Only regulations that carried
the FOL could provide for penalties.115 The FOL, in that sense,
was shorthand for a question of statutory construction: did
Congress delegate to agencies the power to promulgate and
define civil or criminal penalties?116 Because the Supreme Court
had abdicated its enforcement of the strict nondelegation
doctrine, this FOL concept was something like a last stand for
the formalist separation of powers during the interwar years.
That is, until the nondelegation doctrine’s brief resurgence in

109. See id. (“‘Interpretive rules’ are nonbinding substantive rules that
advise the public about how an agency interprets a particular statute or
legislative rule that it administers.” (footnote omitted)).
110. See id. at 495 (suggesting that the FOL drafting convention “was
never explicitly memorialized in an authoritative text, such as a statute, a
legislative drafting guide, or a prominent judicial decision”).
111. See generally Baumann, supra note 98 (advising the Senate that the
Air Commerce Act of 1926 is constitutional by analyzing the distinction
between interpretive and legislative rules).
112. See id. (suggesting that the broad nondelegation principle laid down
by the Supreme Court had been compromised in a series of cases).
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id.
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1935.117 Regardless, one important bottom-line from this FOL
approach was that “interpretive regulations”—that is,
“expressions of departmental opinion [had] no binding force on
anyone.”118
On the ground, delegation and the FOL merged into a
simple question of statutory interpretation. “[T]he requisite
textual signal was provided by the inclusion of a separate
provision in the statute attaching ‘sanctions’ to the violation of
rules and regulations promulgated under a particular
rulemaking grant.”119 Practically, an interpreter could tell
whether a rule carried the FOL by checking whether the
underlying statute “prescribed a sanction” and the “the
authority to make ‘rules and regulations[.]’”120 In the absence of
these cues, the rule was interpretive and did not carry the
FOL.121
From this drafting convention, we get a sense of the FOL in
its purest and earliest form. An agency action carries the FOL
when it binds parties. That is, when parties could face civil or
criminal penalties for failing to obey. This concept has several
distinct features. First, it tracks the idea of what “law” meant
in the early twentieth century: “general commands backed by
the threat of sanctions.”122 This view of what it means to “bind”
focuses on regulated parties and hinges on the imposition of
117. See generally A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating regulations of the poultry industry on
nondelegation grounds); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935)
(same with regulations of the petroleum industry). But see Keith Whittington
& Jason Iuliano, The Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 165 U. PA. L. REV.
379, 380 (2017) (arguing that the nondelegation doctrine was not a major
limitation on Congress’s delegation outside of the 1935 resurgence).
118. Baumann, supra note 98, at 30.
119. Merrill & Watts, supra note 8, at 493.
120. Id. at 493. Merrill and Watts cite a litany of statutes from the preAPA era that follow this convention, including Federal Water Power Act, ch.
285, §§ 25, 41 Stat. 1063, 1076 (1920) (repealed 1935) (attaching criminal
penalties to violations of the Federal Power Commission's rules and
regulations).
121. See id. at 494 n.125 (“[D]eclaring that the FTC has the power ‘to
classify corporations and to make rules and regulations for the purpose of
carrying out the provisions of this Act’ but providing for no sanctions for the
violation of those rules and regulations”) (quoting Federal Trade Commission
Act, ch. 311, § 6(g), 38 Stat. 717, 722 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 46(g) (2000)).
122. Id. at 494 n. 126 (quoting JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF
JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 13–15 (Prometheus ed. 2000) (1832)).
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sanctions by the state.
It reflects administrative law’s
preoccupation, then and now, with the imposition of legal
sanctions and obligations.123
Second, this view of the FOL is essentially a question of
congressional intent.124 The question, squarely put, is whether
Congress gave agencies the power to promulgate sanctions. This
version of the FOL established a very particular meaning behind
what it means to “bind” and whose perspective matters. It
functions as a springboard for further and more elaborate
meanings discussed infra.
C. The Spread of the FOL
While the FOL helped crystallize a drafting convention and
negotiated the distance between the Supreme Court’s rhetoric
and reality, the need for reformulating the standards for judicial
review of agency actions only grew in importance.125 The FOL,
once entrenched, continued to spread to other areas of the
administrative law canon. It first spread to the realm of
justiciability doctrines.126 In the beginning, judicial review of
agency actions was restrictive and was primarily focused on the
enforcement action. This convention meant that judicial review
was reserved for agency decisions to enforce a statute or rule
against a regulated party after a decision was already made. In
the words of the 1941 Report of the Attorney General’s
Committee on Administrative Procedure, judicial review of
agency actions was collateral; cases were brought “in actions
brought to enforce [agency orders], in injunction suits to prevent
their enforcement, in declaratory judgment proceedings, in
habeas corpus actions to obtain release from arrests for
violation, or in private actions in which the results turned upon
123. See Cary Coglianese et al., Unrules, 73 STAN. L. REV. 885, 938–41
(2021) (documenting this preoccupation’s consistency over the last century).
124. See Merrill & Watts, supra note 8, at 494.
125. See generally Beau J. Baumann & Greg Mina, Clowning Around with
Final Agency Action, 28 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 329 (2018) (arguing that
prior to the passage of the APA, courts developed doctrines of judicial review
that approximated common law theories of adversity and timing).
126. See ARTHUR LENHOFF, COMMENTS, CASES, AND OTHER MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION 723, 759 (1949) (“Since binding regulations must be granted the
status of statutes, their reviewability by the courts follows the same principles
which control the judicial reviewability of acts of the Legislatures
themselves.”).
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the effect of regulations.”127 That form of review mimicked the
type of injuries that would have sufficed under the common law
model.128 But changing regulatory models placed pressure on
courts to expand their notions of judicial review.
Courts were increasingly preoccupied with whether they
had jurisdiction in the absence of an enforcement action. The
Supreme Court had, for example, determined early on that
federal courts lacked jurisdiction over an agency’s decision to do
nothing at all.129 That ruling reflected the Courts’ desire to
maintain a level of adversity that would have been taken for
granted in the nineteenth century.130 In Proctor & Gamble Co.
v. ICC, the Supreme Court reviewed the ICC’s refusal to act on
a shipper’s petition.131 The petition asserted that the ICC’s
regulations were “unjust and oppressive.”132 When the petition
was denied, the ICC sought an injunction in federal court.133
Importantly, Proctor & Gamble was not asserting its arguments
from a defensive posture in an enforcement proceeding.
Accordingly, the Court held that it lacked jurisdiction over the
case because the rules were negative in nature—i.e., it was not
enforceable and merely determined a regulated party’s status
under the relevant statute.134 The Court’s “negative order”
doctrine expanded and precluded review of certain agency
actions.135
Ultimately, though, New Dealers on the Court expanded
notions of justiciability using the FOL. The new status quo was
embodied in the Rochester opinion, the holding of which can be
summarized as follows:
127. FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, S. Doc. No. 77-8 at 1, 115 (1941) [hereinafter 1941
AG Report].
128. See id. (the 1941 Report of the Attorney General’s Committee on
Administrative Procedure preferred judicial challenges after an agency action
occurred because “[t]he decision w[ould] be the kind courts are accustomed to
render[ing].”).
129. See, e.g., Proctor & Gamble Co. v. United States, 225 U.S. 282, 297–
302 (1912).
130. See, e.g., Baumann & Mina, supra note 125, at 334.
131. 225 U.S. 282, at 290–91.
132. Id. at 287.
133. See id. at 287–89.
134. See Charlotte Anschuetz, The Negative Order Doctrine: Rochester
Telephone Corporation v. United States, 24 WASH. U. L.Q. 591, 592 (1939).
135. See id. at 591–92.
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Agency actions that can only have the effect of forbidding or
compelling actions on the part of a regulated party if some
further administrative action is taken do not carry the FOL and
are unreviewable prior to enforcement;
Agency actions that decline to “relieve the [regulated party]
from a statutory command forbidding or compelling conduct on
his part” carry the FOL and will be reviewable under certain
circumstances;
Agency actions that are attacked in court because they do
not “forbid or compel conduct by a third person” will carry the
FOL and will be reviewable.136
Note the work that these categories perform; courts ought
to evaluate different modes of regulatory behavior on a FOL
basis using analogies to enforcement actions.137 After Rochester,
an agency’s decision to not intervene and relieve a regulated
party of some burden was reviewable.
The theoretical
justification for this review was an expansion of the FOL to
include agency decisions not to act.
The focus on pre-enforcement judicial review was central to
one other pre-APA decision: Columbia Broadcasting System v.
United States.138 That case asked whether federal courts had
jurisdiction over CBS’s challenge to a new FCC regulation that
would have “affect[ed] adversely [CBS]’s contractual relations
with broadcasting stations and impair[ed] its ability to carry on
its business in maintaining and operating its nationwide
broadcasting network.”139 The Court’s decision turned on
whether the new FCC regulation was a substantive rule.140 The
Court reviewed the regulation’s effect and determined that “in
its genesis and on its face, and in its practical operation” the
regulation was a rule that affected the rights of the regulated
entities.141 This effect meant, by definition, that the regulation
“was adopted by the Commission in the avowed exercise of its
rule-making power” and, therefore, carried “the force of law.”142
136.
(1939).
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

See Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 129–130
See id.
See 316 U.S. 407 (1942).
Id. at 408.
See id. at 416–17.
Id. at 417.
Id.

21

2021

THE FORCE OF LAW AFTER KISOR

45

So, in the other consequential pre-enforcement review
decision of the pre-APA era, the Court’s inquiry boiled down to
whether the regulation carried the FOL.143 And the FOL was
the power to “bind” regulated entities and affect their rights.144
Leading to the passage of the APA, the justiciability case law
had its own unique flavor emphasizing flexibility and a
pragmatic view of agency actions’ effects.145 As I will discuss
infra, this era is still having a lasting impact.
The case law prior to the enactment of the APA in 1946 was
shaped by the FOL in the contexts of distinguishing categories
of rules, negotiating the permissibility of delegations of
legislative power, and in determining whether pre-enforcement
review was available to regulated parties. The division between
different rules focused on coercion, the power to bind regulated
parties with sanctions.
That FOL is concerned with
congressional intent and focuses squarely on the perspective of
regulated parties. In the justiciability context, the notion of the
FOL and what it means to “bind” a regulated party is more
flexible and capacious. The Rochester framework engages in a
pragmatic review of whether an agency action is “binding” from
the perspective of regulated parties. If an agency action clearly
entails penalties, then the action carries the FOL and is subject
to pre-enforcement review, at least for some plaintiffs. But
Rochester suggests that a failure to act or to levy penalties on a
regulated party will sometimes be reviewable if there is a
practical effect on regulated parties. Accordingly, the pre-APA
era gave us two competing understandings of the FOL and what
it means to “bind.” Both strains are complicated by competing
formalistic and pragmatic traditions.146

143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id. (“Such regulations which affect or determine rights generally,
even though not directed to any particular person or corporation, when
lawfully promulgated by the Interstate Commerce Commission, have the force
of law[.]”).
146. See, e.g., William Funk, Make My Day! Dirty Harry and Final Agency
Action, 46 ENV’T. L. 313, 330 (2016) (discussing the alternative trends of
formalism and pragmatism in the final agency action context); see also
Baumann & Mina, supra note 125, at 331–32.
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D. Interpreting § 553
The drafting process that culminated in the enactment of
the APA stretched on for a decade.147 It was initiated by
conservative proponents who feared the intervention of New
Dealers in private markets.148 These political machinations ran
concurrently with intellectual developments seeking to make
sense of the perceived rise of administrative governance.149
These roiling circumstances were enlivened by world events,
specifically the rise of fascism and dictatorship, which
influenced thinking on administrative governance.150 When the
APA did emerge, it represented a litany of “hard-fought
compromise[s] that left legislators and interest groups far from
completely satisfied.”151 Both before and after its passage,
parties sought to shape a system of administration that
controlled the power of government to constrain obligations.152
The debates around the APA focused, to a considerable extent,
on the power of agencies to “bind.” They focused, in no small
part, on the FOL.
This Part discusses the text and structure of the APA and
examines how § 553 has been interpreted. However, it should
be noted at the outset that the importance of § 553 is not
apparent on the APA’s face. At the time the APA was enacted,
agencies “did not adopt many legally binding regulations.”153
When they did, they usually used the APA’s formal rulemaking
procedure.154 The Supreme Court obviated formal rulemaking
in its United States v. Florida East Coast Railway Company
147. See Coglianese et al., supra note 123, at 939.
148. See id.
149. See ERNST, supra note 93, at 108–18 (recognizing this controversy
around agencies and analyzing the intellectual developments that helped ease
the transition to administrative governance).
150. See George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative
Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1559
(1996). For a barn-burning draft article on the importance of the rise of fascism
on the intellectual framework for administrative governance, see generally
Noah A. Rosenblum, The Antifascist Root of Presidential Administration,
COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (arguing that New Dealers accepted
constitutionalism and the separation of powers to guard against fascism).
151. Shepherd, supra note 150, at 1560.
152. See Coglianese et al., supra note 123, at 939.
153. Hickman, supra note 78.
154. See id.
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opinion.155 As a result, agencies now promulgate rules through
the informal method laid out in § 553.156 So, the centrality of
§ 553 to this Article is fallout from what scholars call “The Lost
World of Administrative Law.”157 That phrase has become
synonymous with the reality that reigning administrative
procedures are at odds with the procedures found in, and
prescribed by, the APA.158 Regardless, this transformation was
a boon for the FOL.
Once the courts were confronted with large scale informal
rulemaking, the text and structure of § 533 became more
significant. It provides as follows:
(b) General notice of proposed rule making
shall be published in the Federal Register, unless
persons subject thereto are named and either
personally served or otherwise have actual notice
thereof in accordance with law.
...
Except when notice or hearing is required by
statute, this subsection does not apply—
To interpretive rules, general statements of
policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure,
or practice[.]159
The core meaning of the provision can be, and has been,
obtained through the normal tools of interpretation, without
resorting to outright construction.160 Subsection A provides an
exemption
from
notice-and-comment
rulemaking
for
“interpretive rules” and “general statements of policy”
(collectively guidance). From there, most interpreters use
negative inferences and the structure of the APA to construe

155. See 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
156. See id.; see also Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. § 553.
157. See generally Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost
World of Administrative Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1137 (2014) (explaining the
increasing disparity between the APA and the realities of modern regulation).
158. See id. at 1136–42 (giving the demise of formal rulemaking as an
example).
159. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2012).
160. See generally Solum, supra note 77 (explaining the difference
between interpretation and construction).
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§ 553. Interpreters infer that “substantive” or “legislative” rules
are the targets of notice-and-comment rulemaking from the fact
that guidance documents are exempted.161 Because a member of
the public with a middling understanding of pre-APA
administrative law would likely understand the categories of
“substantive” and “interpretive” rules that preexisted the APA,
this negative inference is permissible.162 That is also an
inference supported by exogenous evidence, such as the fact that
an initial draft of the APA stated that “substantive rules” were
subject to notice-and-comment.163 From this, the categorization
of rules looks unchanged from the pre-APA period.164
The APA does not define what constitutes a “substantive
rule.”165 There was, of course, a specialized meaning behind that
phrase in the pre-APA period.166 From that specialized meaning,
we can infer that “substantive” or “legislative” rules are defined
by virtue of carrying the FOL. This importation of the pre-APA
meaning is complicated by ongoing debates over whether the
APA was meant to codify the existing administrative law.167
Nonetheless, in the absence of some textual or structural cue to
the contrary, the best reading of individual and long-tenured
terms in the APA is best set against the pre-APA case law. This
approach is confirmed by external sources. Because courts have
given great weight to the Attorney General’s Manual on the
Administrative Procedure Act,168 that source’s understandings
have been used to fill in the categorical definitions for different
rules.169 And the manual defined substantive rules by reference
161. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 15, at 288 n.124.
162. See Bernick, supra note 11, at 843 (outlining this approach to
interpreting the APA); see also supra Section II.A.–B. (demonstrating that the
FOL was used to develop the categories of “substantive” and “interpretive”
rules before the enactment of the APA).
163. See supra Section II.A–B.
164. But see Robert A. Anthony, “Interpretive” Rules, “Legislative” Rules
and “Spurious” Rules: Lifting the Smog, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 8–10 (1994)
(offering a slightly different interpretation of § 553 whereby guidance that has
practically binding effect should be known as a “spurious rule”).
165. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301–02 (1979).
166. See Solum, supra note 77, at 114 (arguing that specialized meanings
available to audiences of legal practitioners can be used to determine linguistic
meaning).
167. See generally Bernick, supra note 11, at 812 n.26 (collecting sources
that encapsulate this long-running dispute).
168. See id. at 812.
169. See id.
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to the FOL. It referred to substantive rules as those that
“implement” the statute “[s]uch [that the] rules have the force
and effect of law.”170 The manual also suggested that guidance
is primarily focused on advising the public as to an agency’s
construction of statutes and rules.171
The foregoing demonstrates how the FOL survived the
hectic period culminating in the passage of the APA. Because
notice-and-comment rulemaking hinges on the categorization of
rules along the same lines used in the pre-APA period, we might
make several inferences about the FOL. First, interpreters of
all stripes have determined that the APA structure is meant to
make agencies pay the toll of notice-and-comment rulemaking
before their rules can carry the FOL.172 That adds a processual
component to the FOL. If an interpreter is trying to determine
whether an agency rule “binds” her, she may start with the
process that led to the rule’s promulgation. This may cut against
the second permissible inference: that the FOL implicated by
§ 553 is formalistic in the style of the drafting convention
discussed above. The processual focus of § 553 contradicts the
focus of the FOL drafting convention: congressional intent with
respect to penalties. But most interpreters of the APA believe
that the earliest form of the FOL—the power to bind parties
with penalties—is the “raison d’être” of the post-APA
administrative state.173 That understanding “permeates much
of the APA.”174 These issues—how we should construe the FOL
distinction between legislative rules and guidance documents—
170. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 30 n. 3 (1947).
171. See id.
172. See Hickman, supra note 21, at 473–75.
173. See Coglianese et al., supra note 123, at 938 (citing STEPHEN BREYER,
REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 378 (1982) (describing administrative law’s
“original objective” as one of “control[ling] government incursions upon private
liberty and property interests”)); Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein,
Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1202–03 (1982)
(“Under the traditional model of administrative law, . . . the system limits the
power of government, maintains a well-ordered sphere of private liberty, and
preserves the system of market exchange.”); Richard B. Stewart, Essay,
Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 438–
39 (2003) (“The traditional core of administrative law has focused on securing
the rule of law and protecting liberty . . . Here the function of administrative
law is primarily negative: to prevent unlawful or arbitrary administrative
exercise of coercive power against private persons.”).
174. Coglianese et al., supra note 123, at 938 (footnote omitted).
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are hard to address in a vacuum, so the remainder of the Article
will explore the difficulties that flow from § 553.
Before proceeding, one point bears mentioning. There is
very little from the text or structure of the APA connecting § 553
to the modern deference regimes. There was, however, one
remark in § 553’s legislative history that could be interpreted as
invoking the concept of deference. As noted above, § 553(b)(A)
permits agencies to issue “interpretive rules, general statements
of policy, [and] rules of agency organization, procedure, or
practice”
without
going
through
notice-and-comment
rulemaking.175 The 1945 committee print mentioned the
following in discussing the § 553 exemptions: “[a]nother reason,
which might be added [for including the exemption], is that
‘interpretive’ rules—as merely interpretations of statutory
provisions—are subject to plenary judicial review, whereas
‘substantive’ rules involve a maximum of administrative
discretion.”176 In another context, opponents of the heightened
deference regime have cited this remark as evidence that the
APA prohibits deference.177 This portion of the legislative
history is something of a mystery.178 Even if we think the
“deference” referenced by the Committee is equitable with either
Chevron or Auer deference, the committee’s assertions about
plenary review were—in the recent words of Ronald Levin—
”poorly reasoned as a rationale for the exemption.”179 The
Committee’s presumption that legal questions would receive de
novo judicial review was a poor understanding of the law even
in the 1940s.180 Just a few years prior, the Attorney General’s
175. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A).
176. S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CONG., REP. ON THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (Comm. Print 1945), reprinted in S. COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT,
S. DOC. NO. 79-248, at 18 (1946).
177. CALEB NELSON, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 707 n.26 (2011); John F.
Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 194
n.406 (1998).
178. See Ronald M. Levin, The APA and the Assault on Deference, 106
MINN. L. REV. 125, 157–59 (2021) (discussing this portion of the APA’s
legislative history, its treatment in the literature, and ultimately discounting
the remark’s relevance).
179. Id. at 158.
180. Id. (citing Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative
Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L.J. 511, 514 (describing the remark’s
assumptions about de novo review as a “quite mistaken presumption”)).
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Final Report on Administrative Procedure made clear that de
novo review “seems not to be compelled” even on questions of
law.181 Indeed, the most recent view of this portion of the APA’s
legislative history appears to be one of great skepticism.182
Because the remark about deference “reads more like an
afterthought” at the very end of a long series of arguments in
favor of the exemption, I am inclined towards discounting it in
my own analysis.183 With that in mind, the text, structure, and
history provide no clear connection between § 553 and the
modern regimes of heightened deference. As things stood in
1946, the FOL was conceptually separate from deference as we
understand it today.
E. The FOL Under the APA
By the middle of the twentieth century, the FOL concept
was used in several distinct areas of the rising field of
administrative law.184 The concept had important implications
for the justiciability of agency actions, just like in the common
law era.185 Under the APA, the eligibility of legislative rules for
181. See 1941 AG Report, supra note 127.
182. See Levin, supra note 178.
183. Levin, supra note 15 at 323.
184. See, e.g., Home Shipping Co., S.A. v. United States, 239 F. Supp. 226,
231–32 (D. Del. 1965) (finding in a suit against the government, provision in
the Aids to Navigation Manual of the U.S. Coast Guard lacked the FOL and
therefore could not be the basis for liability); Hester v. Melidosian, 261 F. Supp.
659, 661 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (outlining that a regulation acquired the FOL
overtime and protected agency officials’ discretion); United States v. Sawyer
Fuels, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 876, 878 (D.N.D. 1961) (dodging claim that regulation
carried the FOL and was an unconstitutional delegation of Article I power);
United States v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 133 F. Supp. 726, 735 (D. Neb.
1955) (refusing to adopt the agency’s interpretation of the statute it enforced
because its interpretations did not carry the FOL).
185. See, e.g., Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1, 8 (D.D.C. 1971) (holding that
pre-enforcement judicial review was permissible because the relevant agency
action carried the FOL and the parties were sufficiently adverse) (citing
Columbia Broad. Sys. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942)). The FOL
continues to play an important role in the justiciability context through the
“final agency action” requirement. See also Administrative Procedure Act of
1946, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (“Agency action made reviewable by statute and final
agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are
subject to judicial review.”). Some courts interpret the FOL as a requirement
for finality. See Pharm. Rsch. & Mfrs. of Am. v. U.S. H.H.S., 138 F. Supp. 3d
31, 41 (D.D.C. 2015) (“Admittedly, interpretive rules, guidance policies, and
other general agency statements that lack the force of law ‘generally do not
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pre-enforcement review is beyond peradventure.186
Preenforcement review for rules that did not go through notice and
comment often turns on whether the underlying rule is a
disguised legislative rule.187 If the rule is not legislative in
character, the availability of pre-enforcement judicial review is
more complicated. At the beginning of the APA era, agency
practices depended on guidance and interpretive rules much less
than they do now.188 The availability of pre-enforcement judicial
review for nonlegislative rules would not become a major issue
in the field for several decades.
In the last few decades, courts have been under increasing
pressure to ferret out disguised legislative rules. In 1992, Robert
Anthony published an ACUS study on guidance that moved the
case law in a new direction.189 Anthony argued that a
nonlegislative regulation could coerce private parties without
going through § 553’s procedures.190 This result, according to
Anthony, would subvert the policy tradeoff at the heart of
§ 553—the FOL for notice and public scrutiny.191 Anthony’s
work launched a move towards recognizing that regulations
could have “practical binding effect.”192 To restate Anthony’s
thesis, guidance documents could carry the FOL by virtue of
their coercive effect on regulated parties.193
Whether guidance carries coercive effects became an
important test in some circuits.194 In the Texas v. United States
qualify’ as a final agency action.”).
186. See Lindsay, supra note 17, at 2451 (“Legislative rules, then, are
uncontroversially ‘final agency action’ that may be judicially reviewed before
ever being enforced against a regulated party.” (footnote omitted)).
187. See, e.g., Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 250–51 (D.C.
Cir. 2014) (framing the entire finality analysis around whether guidance was
really “legislative” in character).
188. See Nicholas R. Parrillo, Federal Agency Guidance and the Power to
Bind: An Empirical Study of Agencies and Industries, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 165,
168 (2019) (quoting an interview with a former senior FDA official who said
that he “cannot imagine a world without guidance”).
189. See Anthony, supra note 164.
190. See id. at 6–12.
191. See id. at 13–14.
192. See id. at 12–15.
193. See Levin, supra note 15, at 275 (“By giving a policy statement
practical binding effect, an agency can illicitly have the best of both worlds; it
can impose policies of its choosing in a document that has never been subjected
to the discipline of APA rulemaking.”).
194. See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1021 (D.C.
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litigation around President Obama’s Deferred Action for Parents
of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA)
program, the court asked whether the DAPA rule “(1) ‘impose[d]
any rights and obligations’ and (2) ‘genuinely leaves the agency
and its decision-makers free to exercise discretion.’”195 In its
inquiry, the Fifth Circuit emphasized the pragmatic portion of
the FOL tradition.196 Cases like Texas v. United States have had
a cascading effect on the FOL across the board. In the
justiciability context, courts have emphasized a pragmatism
that gauges the effects of agency action on regulated parties.197
That mode of analysis “may well be the single most frequently
litigated and important issue of rulemaking procedure before the
federal courts today.”198
Note that the “practical binding effect” test stands in some
tension with the text of § 553, which does not explicitly provide
for judicial review as a way of reinforcing the distinction between
legislative rules and guidance.199 Nonetheless, courts have
adopted that standard and asked whether the “document in
question expresses or implements a policy judgment in a binding
fashion.”200 Ultimately, the test turns on whether the agency
considers the position definitive.201 The agency cannot, for

Cir. 2000); Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 173–76 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d
by equally divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016); Texas v. EEOC, 933 F.3d 433,
443–46 (5th Cir. 2019).
195. 809 F.3d at 171.
196. See id. at 173 (“The DACA and DAPA Memos purport to grant
discretion, but a rule can be binding if it is ‘applied by the agency in a way that
indicates it is binding,’ and there was evidence from DACA’s implementation
that DAPA’s discretionary language was pretextual.”).
197. See Texas v. EEOC, 933 F.3d at 441–46 (the Fifth Circuit held that
an agency’s guidance was final agency action even though the guidance could
not bind regulated parties without another agency’s decision to enforce). This
case was the first to adopt an approach to finality advanced by the author in
another piece of scholarship. See Baumann & Mina, supra note 125, at 359–62
(suggesting that an agency action may still be “final” for the purposes of APA
review even if it could not directly “bind” the relevant regulated party).
198. Levin, supra note 15, at 263.
199. See id. at 289 (“On their face, the notice-and-comment provisions of
§ 553 set forth preconditions for the promulgation of legislative rules–or
substantive rules . . . . Under a literal reading of the statute, those provisions
do not seem to impose any restrictions at all on the issuance or use of guidance
documents.”).
200. Id. at 291.
201. See id.
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example, rely on a policy statement as if it were law.202 One
formulation of the binding effect test focuses on whether the
guidance in question “impose[s] any rights and obligation” and
whether it “genuinely leaves the agency and its decision-makers
free to exercise discretion.”203 This formulation includes the
traditional meaning of the FOL that focuses on binding
regulated parties with respect to penalties. It goes further to
suggest that agencies may “bind” themselves with guidance and
thereby vitiate § 553’s distinction between legislative rules and
guidance. This focus on the agency flows naturally from the
processual implications of § 553. But it is worth noting that the
binding effect test deviates from the FOLs we have discussed so
far, which included focuses on congressional intent (the drafting
convention) and the practical effects of an agency action on
regulated parties (justiciability).
Recently, a debate has opened as to whether this application
of the FOL can be squared with the APA and Vermont Yankee.204
Professor Cass Sunstein has suggested that the binding effect
test violates Vermont Yankee’s prohibition on court-crafted
procedural obligations.205 In other words, Sunstein has argued
that § 553 does not place any procedural limitation on guidance
documents. So the binding effect test can be read as a roadblock
to guidance promulgation with no textual hook in the APA.206
This argument has come under fire, most notably from Professor
Levin.207 As Levin points out, the reason courts have not sided
with Sunstein is because the binding effect test is itself framed
as an interpretation of the APA.208 Further, the test has a
prophylactic quality. It has been justified on the basis that in
its absence agencies could simply treat guidance as binding as a
practical matter and thereby “bind” regulated parties with the

202. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).
203. See American Bus Ass’n v. United States, 627 F.2d 525, 529 (D.C.
Cir. 1980).
204. See generally 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
205. See Cass R. Sunstein, “Practically Binding”: General Policy
Statements and Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 491,
505–12 (2016).
206. See id.
207. See Levin, supra note 15, at 313–15.
208. See id.
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threat of looming enforcement actions.209
While this Article is not meant to vindicate either side in the
debate described above, it is useful in two ways. First, it outlines
the kind of evidentiary burden one might have to make out to
justify a prophylactic rule like the binding effect test. That
standard was only pioneered after considerable debate among
the administrative law community, after empirical analysis of
the risks posed by guidance, and after a significant showing that,
in the absence of the binding effect test, § 553’s guidance
exemption could be undermined.210 To the extent that Justice
Gorsuch’s approach in Kisor can be viewed as a prophylactic
gloss on the guidance exemption, a similar standard of proof
should be met for Gorsuch’s approach to be adopted. Second, the
Sunstein-Levin debate demonstrates the pitfalls when
interpreting § 553. The provision is bare but attempts to flesh it
out may run headlong into a kind of procedural common law that
is antithetical to APA review.
The remainder of the Article will stipulate that the binding
effect test is consistent with the structure of the APA and is
within the permissible glosses on the FOL outlined above.
Notably, the FOL was central to this important test. The FOL
was meant to gauge whether a regulation or its underlying
statute controlled in an enforcement proceeding. Its value as a
heuristic to both courts and regulated parties would be obviated
if agencies could “bind” parties without going through noticeand-comment rulemaking. The approach outlined by Professor
Anthony may have been necessary to smoke out agencies’ ultra
vires action. Further, it does little to alter the original
compromise behind § 553.
F. Taking Stock
Before proceeding, this subsection is meant to review the
FOL as it stood before the year 2000. Above, we have outlined
the “family” of concepts that are referred to by the FOL. By the
209. See id. at 315 (“From this vantage point, the doctrine can be seen as
simply an example of the courts’ longstanding propensity to construe the APA
creatively in order to keep up with the developing needs of the rulemaking
system.”).
210. See id. at 273–86 (describing the development of the binding effect
test).
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end of the 1990s, the FOL had come to play a major role in the
administrative law landscape. As discussed above, the FOL is
the touchstone for determining whether a guidance document
really should have gone through notice-and-comment
rulemaking.211 In that context, the FOL analysis can be
processual or it can focus on penalties that directly affect
regulated parties.212 This analysis can also turn on whether the
agency itself was “bound” by an agency action.213 “Binding” here
takes on a new focus (an agency instead of regulated parties) and
a new meaning (limiting discretion instead of the imposition of
legal penalties).214
In the justiciability context, the FOL has a pragmatic bent
that focuses on the effects of an agency action on regulated
parties. One major vehicle for the FOL in this context is the
APA’s final agency action requirement.215 Most courts import
the FOL and ask whether the challenged agency action “binds”
regulated parties.216 “Binding” here refers to agency actions that
affect legal rights; the actual imposition of civil or criminal
penalties is not required.
While the lower courts have
occasionally been formalistic in their applications of the FOL in
the final agency action context,217 the Supreme Court has
consistently kicked them back into line.218
These examples merely scratch the surface.219 The point is
211. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley, No Harm, No Foul in Texas v. United
States, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Jan. 19, 2016) (“Is the Obama
administration’s deferred action program for the parents of citizens and legal
permanent residents (DAPA) a legislative rule? The Fifth Circuit says [] it
probably is, the administration swears it isn’t[]. The fight matters because, if
DAPA is a legislative rule, it should have gone through notice and comment.”).
212. See Texas v. EEOC, 933 F.3d 433, 443–46 (5th Cir. 2019) (allowing
for pre-enforcement review of an agency action even though it was, by statute,
binding on no one because of the practical effects on the regulated entity).
213. See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 172–73 (5th Cir. 2015)
(teeing up the binding effect test in the context of the DAPA program).
214. See id.
215. See generally Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (interpreting 5
U.S.C. § 704 and establishing a new final agency action standard).
216. See, e.g., Ass’n of Flight Attendants-CWA, AFL-CIO v. Huerta, 785
F.3d 710, 716 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
217. See Baumann & Mina, supra note 125, at 333.
218. See U.S. Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., Inc., 578 U.S. 590
(2016).
219. See, e.g., McAlpine v. United States, 112 F.3d 1429, 1434 (10th Cir.
1997) (using FOL concepts to determine whether there was “law to apply”
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merely to rehash the family of concepts that the FOL refers to.
So far, the FOL will variously focus on (1) congressional intent;
(2) process; (3) binding an agency by limiting discretion; (4)
binding a regulated party with civil and criminal sanctions; and
(5) binding a regulated party by affecting its legal rights. Across
the different FOL domains, “binding” is used with slightly
different meanings. Laid across this diversity is a spectrum of
pragmatism and formalism that can divide outcomes between
and within the lower courts.
IV. FOL AS A TOUCHSTONE FOR DEFERENCE: THE MEAD
REVOLUTION
In 2001, the FOL concept—which by then had already
achieved a pride of place in the administrative law field—
received a boost from the Mead revolution.220 Mead purports to
clarify the deference regime established in Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.221 Under Chevron,
courts defer to agencies’ interpretations of the statutes they
implement if Congress has not “directly spoken to the precise
question at issue” (if the relevant provision is ambiguous) and
the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.222 Depending on your
priors, Chevron deference is either a pillar of the public law or
an unconstitutional blight on the separation of powers.223
Mead asked whether “a tariff classification ruling by the
United States Customs Service deserves judicial deference.”224
Tariff classifications only bound the recipient and were not the
product of either notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal
adjudications.225 In finding that the tariff classification was not
under Heckler review); see also Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Dole, 828 F.2d 799, 803
(D.C. Cir. 1987).
220. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).
221. See 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
222. Id. at 842–43.
223. Compare Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1615–18 (arguing in support of
Chevron deference), with Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1187, 1188–92 (2016) (questioning the constitutionality of Chevron
deference).
224. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 221.
225. See id. at 231. Further, the Court emphasized two other features of
the relevant regulatory process: (1) that no entity was solely responsible for
issuing the letters; and (2) that the agency could change course without any
kind of publicly accountable process.
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eligible for Chevron deference, the Court emphasized that
heightened deference was reserved for agency actions that were
the byproducts of FOL delegations from Congress.226 Here, the
FOL was meant to delineate the law-like agency interpretations
(like the regulatory regime at issue in Chevron) from the scattershot ruling letters of Mead.227
Mead, along with post-APA enactment changes to agency
practice, has placed increased pressure on the traditional FOL
distinction between legislative and nonlegislative rules.228 As a
result of Mead, the Sixth Circuit has pioneered a controversial
shortcut for assessing whether agency actions are final for
judicial review. Because “final agency actions” are ones that
carry the FOL, and because rules that would receive heightened
deference carry the FOL after Mead, the Sixth Circuit has been
willing to merely apply the Chevron two-step analysis instead of
the unwieldy finality case law to determine whether an agency

226. See id. at 221.
227. See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman & Aaron L. Nielson, Narrowing
Chevron’s Domain, 70 DUKE L.J. 931, 957 (2021) (“In other words, the facts in
Mead differed greatly from those in Chevron. Whereas Chevron involved
hierarchical, notice-and-comment rulemaking by the EPA, Mead confronted a
scheme in which dozens of entities may interpret language through hearingfree adjudications.”).
228. The effects of Mead were recently put succinctly by Professors
Hickman and Nielson:
Courts, [after Mead] therefore, generally use the Chevron
standard in evaluating interpretations of ambiguous statutes
offered by agencies in notice-and-comment rulemakings and
in formal adjudications. By contrast, courts typically apply
the less deferential Skidmore v. Swift & Co. standard to
interpretations advanced through informal mediums, like
interpretive rules and policy statements.
Id. at 936–37. This perhaps puts the situation with respect to informal
adjudications and nonlegislative rulemaking a little too neatly. The Court in
Mead went to great lengths to emphasize that it was not finding that informal
adjudications and nonlegislative rulemaking per se lacked the FOL. See Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. at 230 (“It is fair to assume generally that Congress
contemplates administrative action with the effect of law when it provides for
a relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and
deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such force . . . . That said,
and as significant as notice-and-comment is in pointing to Chevron authority,
the want of that procedure here does not decide the case, for we have
sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference even when no such
administrative formality was required and none was afforded[.]”).
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action is final for judicial review.229 Under this approach,
interpretive rules (nonlegislative rules) could be subject to preenforcement review.230 Adding to the confusion, the Sixth
Circuit’s approach stands in stark contrast to the more
formalistic approach of the D.C. Circuit, which has held in
several cases that interpretive rules can never carry FOL by
definition—relying, of course, on the traditional understanding
of the APA.231
Many have argued that the post-enactment reality of agency
deference ought to be considered when determining whether an
agency action should be subject to pre-enforcement review.232 As
a result of the post-enactment shift towards deference, the
argument goes, the FOL concept should be expanded to take
account of heightened deference.233
Further, it is well
documented that nonlegislative rulemaking is now the breadand-butter of agency practice.234 As this trend continues,
agencies will be subject to less judicial review unless the FOL
concept is expanded.
A case prior to Kisor, Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association,
teed up the FOL divide for the Court.235 The case asked whether
the D.C. Circuit’s Paralyzed Veterans doctrine, which required
federal agencies to engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking
when they substantially altered an interpretive rule, is
permissible under the APA.236 The Court unanimously held that
the D.C. Circuit’s doctrine ran afoul of the APA and that the
229. See, e.g., Franklin Fed. Sav. Bank v. Dir., Off. of Thrift Supervisor,
927 F.2d 1332, 1336 (6th Cir. 1991); see also Air Brake Sys., Inc. v. Mineta, 357
F.3d 632, 642 (6th Cir. 2004).
230. See Air Brake Sys., Inc., 357 F.3d at 642.
231. See, e.g., Am. Tort Reform Ass’n v. OSHA, 738 F.3d 387, 393 (D.C.
Cir. 2013) (holding that an interpretive rule was not final because it lacked the
FOL).
232. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1212 (2015)
(Scalia, J., concurring); Air Brake Sys., Inc., 357 F.3d at 642; Lindsay, supra
note 17, at 2455.
233. See Lindsay, supra note 17, at 2455 (opining that “[f]or better or
worse, Chevron deference for interpretative rules is contrary to the practice of
judicial deference that existed when the APA was enacted” and arguing in
favor of an approach that expands the FOL to include agency deference).
234. See Parrillo, supra note 188, at 168 (quoting a veteran EPA lawyer
who also said that he “cannot imagine a world without guidance”).
235. See Perez, 135 S. Ct. 1199.
236. See id. at 1203 (citing Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P.,
117 F.3d 579, 589 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
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Vermont Yankee rule that federal courts cannot add to the
procedural requirements specified in that statute.237 Along the
way, Justice Sotomayor, writing for the Court, relied on what
the Court appears to have believed was an axiom—
”[i]nterpretive rules ‘do not have the force and effect of law and
are not accorded that weight in the adjudicatory process.’”238
That move was a way of deflating the defense of the Paralyzed
Veteran doctrine, which asserted that it merely made agencies
pay a procedural price for “amending” an underlying
interpretive rule.239 Justice Sotomayor argued that agencies do
not literally “amend” regulations by issuing interpretive rules
because agency interpretive rules do not carry the FOL.240 But
that portion of the opinion is dicta because the Paralyzed
Veteran doctrine was vitiated by the Court under the rule from
Vermont Yankee.241 Nonetheless, that dicta played a starring
role in the Kisor opinions.242
237. See id. at 1206 (“The Paralyzed Veterans doctrine is contrary to the
clear text of the APA’s rulemaking provisions, and it improperly imposes on
agencies an obligation beyond the ‘maximum procedural requirements’
specified in the APA . . . .” (quoting Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat.
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978))).
238. Id. at 1204 (citing Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 99
(1995)).
239. See id. at 1208.
240. See id. (“MBA does not explain how, precisely, an interpretive rule
changes the regulation it interprets, and its assertion is impossible to reconcile
with the longstanding recognition that interpretive rules do not have the force
and effect of law.” (citation omitted)).
241. See id. at 1207 (quoting FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556
U.S. 502, 513 (2009)).
242. See id. at 1210. This portion of the opinion prompted several Justices
to write concurrences that touch on the FOL question. See id. at 1210 (Alito,
J., concurring) (clarifying that the Court should not “dismiss” the concern that
interpretive rules—by virtue of the deference regimes—essentially carry the
FOL in contravention of the APA’s structure). See also id. at 1211 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Justice Scalia agreed that the Court’s decision “produces a
balance between power and procedure quite different from the one Congress
chose when it enacted the APA.” He argued that the FOL was not supposed to
extend to interpretive rules under the statute, see id. (“An agency may use
interpretive rules to advise the public by explaining its interpretation of the
law. But an agency may not use interpretive rules to bind the public by making
law, because it remains the responsibility of the court to decide whether the
law means what the agency says it means[]”), but that the APA’s original
safeguards have effectively been undone by the “headless” deference regimes.
Id. Justice Scalia then provides the first thorough case for expanding the FOL
concept to include an agency action’s eligibility for heightened deference:
“[a]fter all, if an interpretive rule gets deference, the people are bound to obey
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V. KISOR AND THE FOL DIVIDE
The FOL argument in Kisor was premised on the idea that
Auer deference erodes the APA’s structural safeguards when it
is granted to interpretive rules.243 That was essentially the same
argument that prompted the bright-line rule in Perez.244
According to Kisor, the APA’s key compromise was enshrined in
5 U.S.C. § 553.245 The APA requires legislative rules to go
through notice-and-comment procedures.246
But the APA
“allows agencies to issue ‘interpretive’ rules without notice and
comment.”247 The supporting logic is that legislative rules, as
opposed to interpretive rules, are legally “binding” and the
agencies should pay a heavier toll for promulgating them.248 The
problem, according to Kisor’s argument, is that by granting Auer
deference to interpretive rules, those interpretive rules then
carry the FOL without having gone through notice and
comment.249
Here, it is worth contemplating what Kisor and Gorsuch
mean when they argued that an interpretive rule that receives
Auer deference is “binding.” Gorsuch suggested that “[u]nder
Auer, courts must treat as ‘controlling’ not only an agency’s duly
promulgated rules but also its mere interpretations.”250 If the
underlying regulation carries the FOL, then the “controlling”
it on pain of sanction, no less surely than they are bound to obey substantive
rules, which are accorded similar deference. Interpretive rules that command
deference do have the force of law.” Id. at 1212. This flexible approach to the
FOL question dovetails with the “flexible” approach the Court has taken in
parallel areas. See U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., Inc., 136 S. Ct.
1807, 1815 (2016) (describing the Court’s “pragmatic” approach to finality).
243. See Brief for Petitioner at 26, Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019)
(No. 18-15).
244. See Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1208.
245. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 243, at 28.
246. See Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1203 (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441
U.S. 281, 302–03 (1979)).
247. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2420 (2019) (citing 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(b)(A)).
248. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 243, at 31 (“The APA authorizes
agencies to issue rules using procedures other than notice-and-comment
rulemaking . . . . ‘But that convenience comes at a price: Interpretive rules do
not have the force and effect of law and are not accorded that weigh in the
adjudicatory process.’” (quoting Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1204) (internal quotation
omitted)).
249. See Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1211 (Scalia, J., concurring).
250. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2434 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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interpretations will be given a “binding” effect.251 The argument
then changes the focus of the FOL from Congress, regulated
parties, and agencies themselves to the federal courts. This
argument dovetails with Justice Scalia’s critique of Auer in
Perez, insofar as Gorsuch is suggesting that the public is
ultimately bound by interpretive rules.252 This FOL critique
became one focus for the plurality. Justice Kagan waived it
away with a definitional argument:
In Mortgage Bankers, we held that interpretive
rules, even when given Auer deference, do not
have the force of law. An interpretive rule itself
never forms “the basis for an enforcement
action”—because, as just noted, such a rule does
not impose any “legally binding requirements” on
private parties.253
This line of reasoning puzzled some observers.254 But
Justice Kagan merely omitted a detailed explanation of her
deeper understanding of the FOL. Her point was that deference
does not turn an interpretive rule into a legislative one because
the FOL does not encompass the purported “binding” of federal
courts through heightened deference.
As discussed in Part II, the pre-APA administrative law
framework divided legislative rules and other regulations along
FOL lines.255 This distinction led to a drafting and interpretive
convention that focused on whether Congress delegated the
power to impose sanctions on a regulated party. That version of
the force of law focuses on binding regulated parties with the
power of coercion.256 Prior to the APA, the FOL was also used in
the justiciability context to refer to agency actions that affected
251. See id.
252. Perez, 145 S. Ct. at 1211–22 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that
Auer lets agencies “use [interpretive] rules not just to advise the public, but
also to bind them”).
253. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2420 (citations omitted).
254. See Bamzai, supra note 10, at 196 (“And therein lies the conflict with
the APA: the plurality’s approach would create a class of agency legal
interpretations that supposedly ‘do not have the force of law’ but nevertheless
are binding on courts through Auer.”).
255. See supra Part II.B.
256. See supra note 105 and above-line text.
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parties’ rights—even in the absence of sanctions.257 And, after
the passage of the APA, tests were adopted to smoke out when
guidance practically limits the discretion of agencies and
thereby vitiates § 553’s guidance exemption.258 Finally, Mead
limited Chevron deference by holding that it is limited to agency
actions that carry the FOL.259
With this background in mind, it becomes clear that the
FOL argument in Kisor has no footing in § 553 or the FOL case
law. To explain why, I must first unpack what “deference”
means in administrative law. Whether Auer or Chevron “binds”
anyone at all likely turns on the ontology of deference.260
Recently, two excellent articles have tried to “categorize”
Chevron.261 Commentators have “variously describe[d] Chevron
as a standard of review, a canon or method of statutory
interpretation, and a rule of decision.”262 And although Chevron
is not applied consistently by either the Supreme Court or the
lower federal courts, there is a developing consensus that
Chevron deference is a standard of review flowing from
§ 706(2)(A).263 Although there are cases that apply Chevron as
a rule of interpretation, Chevron was itself about construction
and that is the doctrine’s proper application.264
The scholarship described above is—to put the point

257. See supra Part II.C.
258. See supra Part II.E.
259. See supra Part III.
260. See Michael Dorf, The Ontology of Sovereign Immunity, DORF ON LAW
(May 31, 2018), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2018/05/ (“‘Ontology’ is a fancy word
for the nature of a thing.”) (internal quotes omitted).
261. See generally Hickman & Hahn, supra note 30, (asking whether
Chevron is a rule of decision, a standard of review, or a canon of construction);
Solum, supra note 22 (same but with a strong emphasis on the interpretationconstruction distinction).
262. Hickman & Nielson, supra note 28, at 992 (collecting citations).
263. See Hickman & Hahn, supra note 30, at 617–18 (“And we argue that
Chevron is an evolving judicial construction of . . . § 706(2)(A) arbitrary and
capricious standard, which is unquestionably a standard of review.”); Solum,
supra note 22, at 296 (“Deference to an agency implementing rules in the
construction zone is entirely consistent with a textualist reading of the ‘shall .
. . interpret statutory provisions’ language of Section 706.”).
264. See Solum, supra note 22, at 270 (“Much of the writing about Chevron
seems to assume that the Chevron doctrine is about interpretation . . . . [T]here
are cases of that kind, but the actual Chevron decision in the original case is
best understood as involving judicial deference to an agency’s implementing
rules in the construction zone.”).
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bluntly—excellent. It accurately describes agency deference at
a conceptual level and how it is applied most of the time by the
federal judiciary. The foregoing analysis turns on a stipulation
that agency deference is properly construed as a tool of
construction flowing from § 706. This includes the Auer
deference at issue in Kisor.265
With this background in mind, it becomes clear that the
FOL argument in Kisor has no footing in § 553 or the FOL case
law. Remember that Justice Gorsuch’s argument is premised on
the idea that Auer deference “binds” judges. But that term is a
misnomer. Auer and Chevron, properly understood, are not
“binding” rules of interpretation.266 Instead, they are rules of
“construction.”267 The interpretation-construction distinction is
of great importance here. The deference regimes flow from the
realization that the relevant statutory or regulatory text has
essentially run out, so that the language will permit a zone of
“reasonable” interpretations. The focus on the “binding” of
judges here has no parallels in the case law. It does not focus on
the “binding” of regulated parties or agencies. Gorsuch’s theory
is not rooted in congressional intent or the ability of agencies to
levy penalties on regulated parties.
Of course, the deference regimes are standards for review
that flow from statutory text that are “binding” law. But these
doctrines, when they apply, do not “bind” anyone in a way that
is distinct from how any other standard of review with a
statutory hook is “binding.” For example, “hard look” review
flows from § 706, the same as Chevron.268 Both doctrines are
part of evolving case law construing § 706’s requirements. But
we would not describe a court’s decision that an agency action
survives hard look review as “binding” in the sense implicated
by § 553 of the APA. The court’s holding is certainly “binding”
in the Marbury sense of that word (i.e., binding as an outcome
265. See Perez v. Wolf, 943 F.3d 853, 864–65 (9th Cir. 2019) (requiring a
district court to decide “the standard of review to apply on remand, including
whether Chevron or Auer deference is appropriate”).
266. See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1647, 1675–78.
267. See id.
268. Hickman & Nielson, supra note 28, at 954. Hard look review was
pioneered by the D.C. Circuit as a way of policing the expansion agency
rulemaking. The Supreme Court ultimately accepted hard look review as a
way of implementing the arbitrary and capricious standard of § 706 of the APA.
See id.
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on the parties before the court), but that decision—by itself—
only preserves the pre-suit status quo and does not itself levy
new obligations on regulated parties. In no sense does a decision
to apply Chevron or Auer deference imbue an agency action with
the FOL.
Under the theory of Auer, the agency’s interpretation is just
a permissible gloss on the regulation.269 In other words, the zone
of permissible constructions established by the statute is still
operable if the relevant regulation is an interpretive one.270 That
courts might defer to an agency’s construction of an interpretive
rule does not change the rule’s character or its relationship to an
underlying statute or regulation. While judges and scholars may
disagree with the default rule of construction that Auer
establishes, nothing about that rule “binds” judges, regulated
parties, or agencies. This is illustrated by Kisor itself, which
provides criteria for the application of Auer deference.271 These
criteria are meant to keep agencies from operating with
lawmaking power in the interstices of guidance. They turn on
traditional tools of interpretation and require a court to
scrutinize the regulation and the underlying statutory regime.
The only rationale that makes sense of Justice Gorsuch’s
position comes from Mead.272 That case’s emphasis on the FOL
could be used to reverse engineer a rule holding that heightened
deference imbues an agency action with the FOL.273 But that
option flows from a misguided understanding of what Mead
meant when it invoked the FOL. There, the Court was
referencing the oldest meaning of the FOL, whether an agency
has been delegated the FOL.274 That question is one of statutory
interpretation which undermines the necessity of adopting

269. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2411 (2019) (“In each case,
interpreting the regulation involves a choice between (or among) more than
one reasonable reading. To apply the rule to some unanticipated or unresolved
situation, the court must make a judgment call.”).
270. See id.
271. See id. at 2406.
272. See supra Section III.
273. See supra notes 215–17 and above-line text.
274. See Hickman & Nielson, supra note 28, at 938 (“Again, the [Supreme]
Court has held that Chevron first and foremost requires a delegation from
Congress to an agency of the power to act with the force of law. Whether
Congress has delegated the authority to adopt legally binding rules and
regulations is readily ascertainable from statutory text.”).
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Justice Gorsuch’s argument.275 To make sure an interpretive
rule does not carry the FOL in the sense implicated by Mead, a
court need only analyze the underlying statutory regime to see
whether Congress has delegated the power to sanction
parties.276 Notably, this analysis has nothing at all to do with
whether that same interpretive rule is owed Auer deference.
Conceding that the text of § 553 is capacious, the case for
Justice Gorsuch’s conception of the FOL—if one views it as a
prophylactic rule—is much weaker than Professor Anthony’s
case for the binding effect test.277 As noted above, existing
doctrine is sufficient to police the Gorsuch’s alleged dangers. No
comparable evidence has been proffered to demonstrate that
Auer poses a threat to the guidance exemption.278 Looming over
this discussion, of course, is the reality that adopting Justice
Gorsuch’s approach would further complicate the FOL, which is
already the cause of confusion across the administrative law
landscape.
One might object that the lesson of Mead is that the FOL is
a precondition to Chevron deference. While that argument has
some intuitive appeal, the Mead-Kisor comparison flows from
the family resemblance between loosely related conceptions of
the FOL. In Mead, the Supreme Court’s invocation of the FOL
simply meant that Chevron deference was limited to “[w]hether
Congress has delegated the authority to adopt legally binding
rules and regulations[.]”279 This is an interpretive question that
is “readily ascertainable from statutory text.”280 Mead is really
a throwback to the pre-APA FOL that dealt with delegations and
the interpretation convention. But whether Congress delegated
binding authority to an agency in some statute is different from
whether an interpretive rule is “binding” in the sense implicated
by § 553. That is, it has nothing to do with whether an
interpretive rule is merely advising the public or is levying new
legal obligations.
275. See id.
276. See id.; supra Section II.B.
277. See supra Section II.E.
278. See generally Daniel E. Walters, The Self-Delegation False Alarm:
Analyzing Auer Deference’s Effect on Agency Rules, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 85, 93
(2019) (demonstrating that the threat of “self-delegation” posed by Auer is
illusory).
279. Hickman & Nielson, supra note 28 at 938.
280. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to comprehend the complexity of the FOL
concept in administrative law. It is so pervasive that the phrase
has become a heuristic for a “family” of interrelated concepts.
What it means to “bind” and who must be “bound” are deeply
contested issues. The outcomes in any given case will depend on
context. But this eclectic basket of concepts does not support
Justice Gorsuch’s FOL argument in Kisor.
Whether an
otherwise legitimate interpretive rule receives the FOL is of no
consequence under any recognized conception of what it means
to “bind.” The textual hook for Gorsuch’s argument, § 553’s
guidance exemption, may be capacious, but the opponents of
Auer deference have not met their burden of demonstrating that
the best way of construing that provision is by eliminating
deference. In sum, the FOL argument in Kisor has no basis in
the administrative law canon and is unjustifiable from the
perspectives of historical practice and commonsense.
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